In February 27, the regime was ready to accept more onerous trm than the JCPOA and they didn’t control Hormuz while Gulf emirates assumed that an US base was the surest way to ensure security.
Today? Th most moderate elemnts of the regime have been discredited by the airstrikes (or straight out killed by these) while hardliners are working hard to remove internal opposition while being emboldened to act outside (see the missile strikes when Bibi threatened to turn Beyruth into the Lebanese version of Rafah or Grozny), enforced a toll on each bot crossing the straight and plenty regional actors are now thinking that US bases are liabilities. Additionally, US arsenals have been dented until the 2030s, and one of the goals of the MOU was to return to status quo ante bellum
The missile program is still existing (and might now have even more popular support), the drones are still available, the HEU is still present (and the guy who issued a religious decree against nuclear weapons has died in the first hours of the war), the regime might enjoy a nice rally to the flag, compared to the January protests, etc…
There’s a reason why plenty gopolitical thinkers in the USA, Israel and Europe are comparing this to the Suez Crisis.